

WARS OF IDEAS AND *THE* WAR OF IDEAS

Antulio J. Echevarria II

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FOREWORD

Many references to “the war of ideas” have appeared in defense literature recently. However, few of them actually shed any light on what wars of ideas are. This monograph, by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, begins by classifying several types of wars of ideas. It is important to note, as the author points out, that physical events, whether intended or incidental, can play determining roles in the ways these kinds of conflicts unfold, and how (or whether) they are resolved. In other words, because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likely that opposing parties will “win” each other over by means of an ideational campaign alone. Moreover, third parties may consider the actions of the belligerents as much more important than the collective merits of their ideas. Thus, while strategic communications remain essential, we may need to manage our expectations as far as what we wish them to accomplish, particularly in the current war of ideas.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the debate on this timely issue.


DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II became the Director of Research for the U.S. Army War College after a military career of 23 years. He has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Europe and the United States. Dr. Echevarria is the author of *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (Oxford University Press, 2007); *Imagining Future War* (Praeger Securities International, 2007); and *After Clausewitz* (University Press of Kansas, 2001). He has also published extensively in scholarly and professional journals on topics related to military history and theory and strategic thinking. Dr. Echevarria is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Princeton University.

SUMMARY

Despite widespread emphasis on the importance of winning *the* war of ideas in recent strategic literature, we find few analytical studies of wars of ideas as such. With that in mind, this monograph offers a brief examination of four common types of wars of ideas, and uses that as a basis for analyzing how the United States and its allies and strategic partners might proceed in the current war of ideas.

Scoping the Problem. Simply put, a war of ideas is a clash of visions, concepts, and images, and—especially—the interpretation of them. They are, indeed, genuine wars, even though the physical violence might be minimal, because they serve a political, socio-cultural, or economic purpose, and they involve hostile intentions or hostile acts. Wars of ideas can assume many forms, but they tend to fall into four general categories (though these are not necessarily exhaustive): (a) intellectual debates, (b) ideological wars, (c) wars over religious dogma, and (d) advertising campaigns. All of them are essentially about power and influence, just as with wars over territory and material resources, and their stakes, can run very high indeed.

Common Wars of Ideas.

Intellectual Debates are disputes in which opposing sides advance their arguments, support them with evidence, and endeavor to refute the reasoning and conclusions of the other. Examples include the ongoing debate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocates, and the recent dispute between the theories of “intelligent design” and evolution.

Ideological Wars are a clash of broad visions usually organized around a doctrine, whether secular or nonsecular. The most popular example of an ideological conflict is the Cold War, which involved political, economic, and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.

Disputes over Religious Dogma are a form of intellectual debate, but they center on conflicting interpretations of sacred tenets or texts, the access to which can be, and often is, deliberately restricted or otherwise limited. Examples include the Sunni-Shiite split within Islam and Catholicism's East-West schism.

Advertising Campaigns are contests between competing producers or vendors for "market share." The objective of such campaigns is to persuade audiences to take desired actions, such as voting for a particular candidate, visiting a certain place, or buying a specific product. A classic example is the "Cola Wars" between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.

Wars of Ideas: Some Conclusions.

Inconclusive outcomes are not unusual in wars of ideas. Opposing sides seldom change their positions based on the introduction of new evidence, or new ways of evaluating existing evidence. Thus, wars of ideas are rarely settled on the merits of the ideas themselves. Instead, they tend to drag on, unless an event occurs that causes the belligerents to focus their attention elsewhere.

When conclusive outcomes do occur, they tend to follow the physical elimination or marginalization of one side's key proponents. In other cases, a major event, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, might occur that renders one side incapable of continuing the conflict or campaign.

Thus, physical events, whether designed or incidental, are in some respects more important to the course and outcome of a war of ideas than the ideas themselves.

"The War of Ideas."

Diverging Approaches? Two diverging schools of thought exist on how the United States and its partners should approach the current "war of ideas" with al-Qaeda and similar groups. The first treats the conflict as a matter for public diplomacy, defined as the "conveyance of information across a broad spectrum to include cultural affairs and political action." Accordingly, this view calls for revitalizing the U.S. Department of State, and reestablishing many of the traditional tools of statecraft.

The second advocates waging the war of ideas as a "real war," wherein the objective is to destroy the influence and credibility of the opposing ideology, and neutralize its chief proponents. It calls for continuing the transformation of the U.S. Department of Defense so that it can better leverage information-age weapons.

Although each approach has merits, neither is informed by an understanding of wars of ideas as such. U.S. strategy for the war of ideas requires a more precise goal than just improving America's image. Winning a popularity contest is far less important than undermining al-Qaeda's ability to recruit. The two aims are certainly related, but eminently separable. Success in the former does not necessarily equate to success in the latter; conflating the two aims only creates confusion.

Recommendations.

- U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must be more alert to the opportunities and pitfalls introduced by physical events. For instance, the successful stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq would have an extremely positive effect on the war of ideas, undercutting al-Qaeda's general information campaign.
- Neither the Department of State's approach nor that of the Department of Defense should be subordinated to the other. Rather, the United States should pursue both approaches in parallel.
- Both Departments should sponsor studies and conferences that will explore wars of ideas in more depth, thereby promoting greater understanding.
- The Joint community should revise its doctrine concerning information operations, to include psychological operations and military deception. The basic assumption underpinning current doctrine is that information operations are a subset of support to military operations. Yet, in some cases, military operations might need to support information operations.
- U.S. doctrine on information operations must also acknowledge that the "information environment" is neither neutral nor static. Disparate cultural and social influences almost always ensure that diverse audiences will interpret the same information differently.
- The U.S. Army's new Human Terrain System, which helps enhance cultural awareness, is an important step in the right direction and should be supported.

By developing an understanding of wars of ideas as a mode of conflict, we can fight the current battle of ideas more effectively, while at the same time better prepare ourselves to wage future ones.

WARS OF IDEAS AND *THE* WAR OF IDEAS

INTRODUCTION

Officials and analysts alike continue to underscore the importance of the “war of ideas” as an integral part of the larger war on terror.¹ The *U.S. National Security Strategy* (March 2006) declares that “From the beginning,” the war on terror “has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas — a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology.”² Likewise, the *U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006) states that “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”³ Similarly, the newly released *U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security* (October 2007) affirms that “the War on Terror is a different kind of war — not only a battle of arms but also a battle of ideas.”⁴ In addition, Stephen Hadley, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, recently explained:

... what we need to do as a nation is come together and put in place the tools we need both to wage the operational war and also to wage the war of ideas. . . . We need to fight this enemy operationally, we need to fight it ideologically, in terms of our values and principles and alternative vision.⁵

Although the importance of the war of ideas is broadly recognized, many analysts warn that the United States is losing that war.⁶ As we shall see, these concerns are partly the result of conflating the war of ideas with the popularity (or, more accurately, the unpopularity) of some U.S. policies, and of America’s image abroad. Interestingly, the United States does not appear to be losing the war of ideas on the home front.

Polls taken by the Pew Research Center show that the “overwhelming majority of American Muslims reject terrorism and religious extremism,” and hold “a positive view of American society,” despite the fact that “more than half say it is more difficult to be Muslim” since September 11, 2001 (9/11).⁷ The tendency to roll general attitudes of anti-Americanism under the rubric of the war of ideas is justified only to a limited extent, and only because our adversaries will try to exploit those attitudes.⁸ It is not helpful to link general negative opinions about the United States to a failure in the war of ideas. The stated policy aim in this battle of ideas is, after all, to “prevent the emergence of violent Islamic radicalization in order to deny terrorists future recruits and [to] defeat homegrown extremism.”⁹ Dissatisfaction with certain U.S. policies does not necessarily equate to support for a global jihad. Some anti-American sentiments existed well before, and quite independently, of the war on terror; and many of them will undoubtedly persist for some time in the future, regardless of how the conflict ends.

Despite this widespread emphasis on winning *the* war of ideas, we find almost no analyses of such wars in today’s voluminous strategic literature. At present, we have a wealth of studies addressing all forms of conventional and unconventional wars, particularly insurgencies. Yet, we find precious few addressing wars of ideas. This dearth is particularly unfortunate given that more than 6 years have elapsed since 9/11.¹⁰ Indeed, various battles of ideas are taking place at any given time.

Hence, an analytical study of wars of ideas, to the extent they are wars, would enhance our understanding of such conflicts and how we might approach them. With that in mind, this monograph, which is necessarily

limited in scope, does two things. First, it offers a brief examination of what appear to be the four basic types of wars of ideas found in history. Second, it uses that examination as a start point for analyzing the principal approaches in the current war of ideas. Just as we would do well to understand the nature of any armed conflict we intend to fight before embarking upon it, so, too, we ought to appreciate the nature of any war of ideas we might attempt to wage.¹¹

Scoping the Problem.

Simply put, a war of ideas is a clash of visions, concepts, and images, and – especially – the interpretation of them; for the images themselves matter much less than the way they are perceived. They are, indeed, genuine wars because they serve a purpose, usually political, social, or economic in nature, and they involve hostile intentions or hostile acts, though they are not always physically violent.¹² History suggests wars of ideas fall into four general categories: (a) intellectual debates, (b) ideological wars, (c) wars over religious dogma, and (d) advertising campaigns. All of them are essentially about power and influence, just as with wars over territory and material resources, and their stakes can run quite high. In fact, many wars of ideas occur as part of larger physical conflicts. One of the principal motives for a war of ideas is fear that others will gain access to, or control of, some form of physical power or material wealth. In some cases, ideas are the most effective weapons for countering such threats.

Nearly every war has an ideational component, but in some conflicts that component plays secondary role. As history shows, propaganda and patriotic rhetoric often escalate into a war of words and images, a battle

of ideas of sorts. Such battles help boost morale and generate material contributions and other support for the physical fighting. Yet, it is not necessary to win such battles to win a physical clash of arms. In the Second World War, for instance, the rhetoric used by the Allies and the Axis powers portrayed the conflict as an all-out struggle between “good and evil.”¹³ However, the ideational struggle was settled on the battlefield, with the physical defeat of Axis forces in Europe and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan. This physical success helped discredit Nazism and Japanese imperialism, except of course in the eyes of fanatics. The physical presence of military forces during reconstruction enabled the Allies to control people and places, and thereby remove, rehabilitate, or reeducate subject populations.¹⁴

It is important to note the difference between wars in which ideas are used mainly to support a physical clash of arms, and others where ideas are either the *casus belli* or the principal weapons. Both types of conflicts are, strictly speaking, wars of ideas. In the former, however, military power initially plays a leading role by defeating an opponent’s armed might, then shifts to a secondary, yet still important role by providing security during reconstruction. In the latter, military power may play only a limited role or perhaps none at all. As noted earlier, U.S. officials see the current war on terror as a combined effort, involving both physical and ideational elements, with the latter more important, if not decisive, than the former. This emphasis suggests that the United States sees itself as engaged in the second type of wars of ideas, where physical force plays a supporting role. However, that is not to say that the use of military force is not important in this conflict, or that there is not a relationship between it and success

and failure in the war of ideas. On the contrary, as the following survey reveals, physical events, to include those brought about by the use of (kinetic) force, often play a critical role in resolving wars of ideas or marginalizing the opposition.

PRINCIPAL WARS OF IDEAS

Intellectual Debates.

An intellectual debate is a relatively common and long-standing form of a war of ideas. We will define it here as any dispute in which opposing sides advance arguments, support them with evidence of some kind, and endeavor to refute the reasoning and conclusions of the other. Not surprisingly, such debates range from the trivial to the consequential. An example of the former might be the various interpretations of literary works by scholars and other critics, particularly those who adhere to some of the tenets of post-structuralism, such as the assertion that we can never know for certain what an author intended to say so we should exclude authorial intent altogether.¹⁵ In contrast, the ongoing debate between Pro-Choice and Pro-Life advocates has raised momentous legal, ethical, and moral issues; a number of doctors and medical personnel lost their lives in the process.¹⁶ The debate was well under way even before the case of *Roe v. Wade*, the 1973 Supreme Court decision that upheld abortion as a constitutional right.¹⁷ An example of an intellectual debate that falls somewhere between trivial and consequential is the controversy over whether the military revolution that purportedly took place in early modern Europe was more of an evolution than a revolution, or whether it was actually a series of punctuated equilibria.¹⁸

Regardless of how we choose to answer this question, the consequential part of the military revolution is how it transformed power relationships both within Europe, and beyond it, at the time (of course, this effect, too, is debatable).

Ostensibly, intellectual debates hinge on the nature and quantity of evidence available, and the interpretations or conclusions we can reasonably draw from that evidence. In theory, debates involve an objective evaluation of available facts, such as they are, and the participants purportedly revise their positions as new information becomes available. However, as Thomas Kuhn has shown, intellectual debates turn as much on the power structures involved in the controversy and what they stand to lose by supporting a particular point of view as much as—or perhaps even more—than they do on the available evidence.¹⁹ Similarly, Sir Karl Popper’s seminal work on “objective” knowledge reveals that what we know, even if developed via the scientific method, is never wholly certain; knowledge is fluid, and the process of knowing is dynamic, affected as much by our underlying assumptions as our imperfect ability to identify and examine those assumptions.²⁰ In short, people from different cultures and backgrounds do not necessarily give an equal amount of credence to the same kinds of evidence.

The recent dispute between the theories of “intelligent design” and evolution is a case in point.²¹ Proponents of the former maintain that Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which is the intellectual foundation for the modern theory of evolution, does not explain the origin of complex forms of life; hence, it is quite likely that some higher intelligence designed them. Opponents of intelligent design counter that this

theory is merely “creationism” in another guise. U.S. District Judge John E. Jones III ultimately ruled that the insertion of the theory of intelligent design into the science curriculum of the Dover Area School District (in Pennsylvania) violated the separation of church and state.²²

Other examples include controversies caused first by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) and later by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) when they advanced heliocentric, or sun-centered, models of the universe.²³ These models challenged the Ptolemaic, or geocentric model, which placed the earth at the center of the universe, and had obvious implications beyond the narrow interests of mathematical astronomy. If the earth was not, in fact, the center of the universe, as sacred texts were purported to have stated, what then was to be made of scriptural authority? In essence, these controversies had as much to do with interpretive authority as with the inadequacies of the geo-centric model, which were already known to many scholars and clerics. In truth, the heliocentric model only undermined literalist interpretations of Christian scripture, an understanding many religious authorities—to include Augustine of Hippo (354-430)—had long cautioned against.

Actually, Copernicus’ work was preceded by that of other students of the stars, to include several Catholic clergymen and Muslim scholars, who had developed computational models which, by implication at least, suggested that the sun was the center of the universe. Nonetheless, Copernicus’ astronomical tables were much more extensive than those of his predecessors, enabling the computation of past as well as future positions of the stars and planets. This predictive quality moved helio-centrism from the category of simple speculation, or hypothesis, to a defensible

theory. The theory was subsequently defended by several astronomers, to include Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) and more famously, Galileo.

This debate was only one of many for Galileo, however. He was also engaged in arguments with other astronomers, including a number of Jesuit scholars, about the nature of sunspots, comets, and science itself.²⁴ Unfortunately, none of the participants in these debates were above inserting a gratuitous *ad hominem* or two in their works to belittle their opponents; such actions quickly and predictably drove the dispute beyond the dialectical quest for knowledge into the baser realm of personal “score-settling.” Even more unfortunately, the timing of Copernicus’ and Galileo’s scientific endeavors coincided with the gathering momentum of the Inquisition and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), which had made the Catholic Church sensitive to scriptural challenges, direct or implied.

Many Church officials, to include Pope Urban III, originally an admirer of Galileo, acknowledged the data supporting the heliocentric model, but cautioned against advocating it as a replacement for the geocentric model, which was also the conventional wisdom even among secular scholars. Evidently, when Galileo published his famous work, *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*, he thought he had complied with Urban’s wishes to avoid advocacy. However, the Church saw the work differently. In 1638, Galileo was brought before the Inquisition on the charge of heresy. The tribunal ordered him to recant, which he refused to do. He was subsequently found guilty and placed under comfortable house arrest where he remained until his death in 1642. According to most historians, he was condemned more for defying papal authority than for the scientific, if flawed, model he advanced.

Such muddled outcomes are typical of intellectual disputes. Proponents on each side are rarely persuaded to change their positions by the introduction of new evidence, or new ways of evaluating the evidence. Instead, they tend to remain entrenched in their positions, convinced of the correctness of their own interpretations, and resolved to carry on the fight in another form, or in another setting, or with different tactics, rather than conceding. Arbitration may have to come from an outside authority, but that decision – as in the example of the debate over Intelligent Design – may only limit the formal jurisdiction of the theory or idea, not its appeal or its informal influence. In some cases, intransigence might have little to do with the evidence, which might be persuasive, and more to do with the political repercussions of conceding. It was not until centuries later that the Catholic Church apologized for condemning Galileo. However, it insists, probably rightly, that its rejection of the heliocentric model was correct based on the scientific standards of proof at the time; Galileo, for instance, could not account for the lack of parallax shifts in the stars' positions, a phenomenon which must occur if the earth moved about the sun.²⁵ So, while Galileo showed that the Ptolemaic model was inadequate, which many already believed, he was not entirely persuasive with regard to his own model.

At first glance, the stakes involved in intellectual debates might not seem particularly high. A scholar advancing a controversial interpretation of the significance of one of Shakespeare's works, for instance, may be denied tenure at an intellectual institution on the basis of his or her views (among other factors). Yet, should that concern the general population? To be sure, such consequences might not impress those outside academia. However, a lack of intellectual diversity in institutions of higher learning can lead

to rigid orthodoxies concerning what is taught at that level, as well as other levels of education. Many scholars promoted racist, Social Darwinist doctrines in Western educational curricula during the 19th century, with disastrous consequences for later generations.²⁶ Thus, the outcomes of intellectual debates can be quite momentous. Likewise, a judge's stand on *Roe v. Wade* could affect whether he or she is confirmed for a seat on the Supreme Court, the rulings of which can obviously prove widely and profoundly influential.

In several of the cases mentioned above, an external event – the decision of a judge or a court – decided the issue. While some assume that such authorities are unbiased and impartial, that is not necessarily true, and it was clearly not true in the case of Galileo. Nonetheless, the decisions above had only limited influence. The debate over the heliocentric system resurfaced later; similarly, the disputes involving evolution and creationism, and those regarding abortion tend to resurface periodically. Other intellectual debates, such as the causes of the French Revolution or of World War I, continue, sometimes with new schools of thought emerging, or old ones trying new perspectives or uncovering new evidence. It would also be inaccurate to say that such debates have no strategic aims, as many of them, such as those pertaining to the causes of the French Revolution, are part of a larger ideological struggle.

Disputes over Religious Dogma.

Disputes over religious dogma are similar to intellectual debates in the sense that the proponents tend to adhere doggedly to their own points of view. The key difference, however, is that the evidentiary

support for battles over religious dogma generally centers on the interpretation of sacred texts, the access to which can be, and often is, deliberately restricted or otherwise limited. Complicating the issue, of course, is that many sacred texts have been forged or falsified, while many others have been lost or may never, in fact, have existed.²⁷ Logic and rigorous analysis, then, can carry the debate only so far. Beyond that, one must make the proverbial leap of faith.

A case in point is the dispute between Augustine of Hippo, the renowned bishop whom the Catholic Church later canonized, and the ascetic monk Pelagius (354-420). At root, the controversy centered on two different views of human nature, which in turn had momentous implications for the traditional understanding of the nature of original sin and the means of salvation. Pelagius believed human beings had the ability to choose, and therefore could choose right over wrong. Because of this capacity for self-determination, humans and their societies were perfectible: progress was possible through right choices. Although Augustine laid down similar views in his early writings regarding the human ability to choose (particularly in his *Confessions*), he later came to reject the Pelagian idea of self-determination. For Augustine, human beings had unconscious urges or feelings which they could not simply choose to not have (a matter with which he had considerable experience). Since these feelings could not be eliminated by choice alone, they required the healing powers of baptism, to absolve one first of original sin, and divine grace, to cleanse one of subsequent sin. Humans could only realize free will and self-determination at the end of a long spiritual healing process by which feelings and the intellect were brought together in union.²⁸ To

summarize the contrast, Pelagius held that human nature was essentially good, though far from perfect, and that God had already given it the intellectual and spiritual tools necessary for its salvation. Humans had but to choose to apply those tools correctly. Augustine, on the other hand, maintained that humans could *not* choose *not* to be humans, and that they are, by their nature, weak and sinful; ergo, humans could not be counted on to choose well, absent the intervention of divine grace.²⁹

Significantly, Augustine's refutation of Pelagius, and its subsequent acceptance by the Catholic Church's engaged but rather deferential clergy, contributed to preserving the Church's assumed role as humanity's spiritual leader and healer. Although Pelagius and his followers appear to have been more interested in reforming human social behavior, which they saw as morally lax, than in setting forth a new religious dogma, Augustine saw their ideas as a threat to the Church's authority and influence, and repeatedly portrayed them as such.

Notably, each side of the controversy had extensive networks of followers and supporters: Pelagius' were located primarily in Britain and Sicily, while Augustine's were found predominantly in Rome and Africa. Several councils met (two in 415 and one each in 416 and 418) to determine whether Pelagius' beliefs were in accord with Church dogma. Augustine's voluminous and detailed arguments had exposed other heresies, and had duly established him as an authority on matters of dogma. In 418, he held a council in Hippo that issued a condemnation of Pelagius' teachings based on nine points which, Augustine correctly demonstrated, directly contradicted Church dogma. Augustine sent the condemnation to Pope Zosimus, strongly urging the

Pope to agree.³⁰ Zosimus consented, and Pelagius was exiled from Rome. He is believed to have died shortly thereafter, in 420, though that remains unconfirmed. Moreover, the circumstances of his death are not clear: some accounts claim he was killed by members of the Catholic Church who feared he might continue preaching; again, none of that has been substantiated. Indeed, Pelagius' ideas, which appear to have been a blend of Celtic individualism and Greek stoicism, have persisted in Christian literature, though in diffused form. Even today, we find the idea of self-determination at the root of any number of modern ideologies and doctrines.

Not surprisingly, the stakes in this dispute ran high. After all, a dominant interpretation of dogma can shape what the members of a particular faith believe for many ages to come. The tenets or principles which comprise religious dogma define not only this life, what it means and how to behave in it, but also the afterlife, what it is, and who shall have it. Augustine obviously understood the stakes, even if some of his fellow bishops did not. Other, perhaps better known and certainly more consequential examples of disputes over religious dogma include the Sunni-Shiite split within Islam and Catholicism's East-West schism. Each of these disputes involved different interpretations of dogma, as well as overlapping political, economic, and cultural issues.

In this example, a physical event—the Pope's decision to exile Pelagius and his resultant departure from the scene—played a key role in resolving the debate. Except for Augustine's and Pelagius' followers, other members of the clergy appear to have been ambivalent. Perhaps not as well-steeped in church dogma as Augustine, they failed to perceive Pelagius'

teachings as a threat. It took Augustine's persistent orchestrations and his detailed comparison between Pelagius' writings and church dogma to move Zosimus to action. That action proved decisive. Again, we can say that this resolution was only a temporary one in the larger picture, however. The debate over human nature has been taken up by many philosophers and theologians since, and remains essentially unresolved.

Ideological Wars.

For purposes of this monograph, an ideology is any organized set of political or philosophical ideas, whether secular or nonsecular. An ideological war differs from a dispute over religious dogma in that the latter involves a disagreement over the interpretation of sacred texts, with the opposing views emerging from within the same religion. Ideological contests, in contrast, often cross secular and nonsecular lines.

Some scholars argue that religious beliefs and ideologies are qualitatively different because the former are more powerful motivators than the latter.³¹ However, making such a distinction seems unnecessary. Religions and ideologies each have their articles of faith; both rely on underlying assumptions that seldom hold up well to rigorous scrutiny. Just as with religion, the principal proponents of an ideology are likely to remain faithful despite an absence of positive proof for their views, and in the face of contrary evidence. Indeed, ideologues, by definition, claim access to a higher source of knowledge which, for them, requires no proof. To be sure, religious beliefs, especially those associated with achieving a place in, or defining, the afterlife, have prompted people to take extreme measures. Such religious concerns were

among the many motives for the Thirty Years' War that ravaged Europe. However, those concerns were also inextricably bound up with some very secular political and material motives. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of any measures more extreme than those associated with Adolph Hitler's Holocaust. Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong also purportedly killed tens of millions of people in the furtherance of their ideological goals. We have little reason, then, for maintaining that nonsecular ideologies are necessarily different from secular ones on the grounds that the former are more destructive than the latter.³²

The most familiar example of an ideological war is, of course, the Cold War, where the political, economic, and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies played out in an ideational realm as well.³³ While the Cold War is considered to have begun at the end of World War II, its roots surely trace back to the Russian Revolution of 1917, which strained relations between the United States and the emerging Soviet Union (which, incidentally, the United States did not recognize until 1933). The antipathy between the two competing ideologies—Marxism-Leninism and Western-style capitalism—began in the mid-19th century, and grew in intensity through the 20th century.

The post-World War II era saw massive propaganda efforts deployed by both sides in an attempt to win the battle of ideas between competing political and economic philosophies.³⁴ This ideational war was fought in classrooms and on college campuses, in journals and books, and in radio broadcasts, television programs, and the silver screen, and, of course, in the courts, and it involved the use of a plethora of catchwords and images. Both sides also exploited international sporting

and other competitive events, such as the Olympics or the World Chess Championships, for propaganda purposes. Far from a contest between the merits and demerits of the theories propounded by Adam Smith or Karl Marx, this ideational struggle often took on a powerful emotional dimension: the pluck and grit of amateur athletes, such as the U.S. Hockey team which accomplished the famous “Miracle on Ice” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic’s (USSR) state-groomed powerhouse of semi-professionals in 1980; or the eccentric and troubled genius of Bobby Fischer defeating the methodical brilliance of Boris Spassky at the World Chess Championship of 1972.³⁵

For the United States and its allies, much Cold War propaganda emphasized success stories, especially those well-suited to a David-versus-Goliath theme. However, there was also a dark, and patently self-destructive, side to the ideological war against communism that both succumbed to, and fostered, an insidious civic paranoia. The “McCarthyism” of the late 1940s and 1950s, for instance, ruined the lives of many loyal Americans, and often did so on little more than unfounded suspicions, or for the sake of political opportunism.³⁶ The use of “loyalty review boards” and other interrogational institutions that went hand-in-hand with McCarthyism may seem like extreme measures, but they are by no means unique as weapons in wars of ideas. Christendom’s religious inquisitions, which ran from the 12th through the 19th centuries, were, in essence, loyalty review boards, but on a grander scale.

History recognizes four major inquisitions. Scholars generally refer to the first as the medieval inquisition, which was a combination of the largely ineffective episcopal inquisition, begun in 1184, and the much more

efficient papal inquisition, initiated by Pope Gregory IX in the 1230s, and carried out with the support of the Dominican order. The second is referred to as the Spanish Inquisition, which began in 1478 at the behest of monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, and was not officially ended until 1834, though in practice it had faded much earlier. The third inquisition began in 1536 at the direction of King Joao III of Portugal, and is thus referred to as the Portuguese Inquisition. The fourth or Roman inquisition, which was designed to combat the spread of Protestantism in Italy, commenced in 1542 at the order of Pope Paul III, and lasted until the middle of the 18th century.³⁷ Collectively, the inquisitions were as much political instruments as they were religious, and the motives for them were as materiel as they were ideational. Their explicit purpose was to ensure that recent converts to Christianity were earnest: many converts apparently did so primarily to avoid persecution and expulsion. However, there were clear economic and political motives behind the Inquisition as well, since many of those accused were wealthy or had political enemies. While much has been made of the inquisitions' use of torture and executions, recent scholarship has challenged those views.³⁸ In fact, the inquisitors gained more by showing mercy and by obtaining confessions than by burning people at the stake. Victory was defined in terms of the number of souls saved through confessions; in contrast, an execution meant a defeat, for it was a failure to save a soul.

Many analysts today advocate using the Cold War model for the war of ideas in the current war on terror.³⁹ The model has much to recommend it. The Cold War lasted several generations and involved multiple dimensions (political, economic, military,

and cultural). However, in other respects, the model is not useful. The Soviet Union was an explicitly defined political-geographic entity, which could be targeted militarily and physically contained, though, to be sure, its ideology of revolution was not limited by physical boundaries. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups naturally need to occupy physical space and are clearly political entities in their own right, albeit with a religiously zealous, anti-Western core; however, they are not geographically identifiable in the same sense, though al-Qaeda's largest base appears to be in the mountains of Pakistan.⁴⁰ More significantly, the decisive event in the war against communist ideology was the economic collapse of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ To be sure, part of that collapse was due to the West's strategy of containment and the fact that it was carried out against fundamentally flawed Soviet economic practices during the post-World War II arms race. However, neither of these causes can be directly attributed to the war of ideas, the propaganda battle between Moscow and the West.

Moreover, a fundamental problem with the Cold War model is that it is essentially impossible to wage an economic war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, or to pursue a strategy of containment, without at the same time harming Muslim states and populations whom we do not want to harm. In addition, it is not clear that the propaganda war that raged between the Western allies and the USSR actually convinced people to believe anything they did not already wish to believe, or had been conditioned to believe. Those indoctrinated in a particular system do not appear especially receptive to propaganda from the other side, unless they have ulterior motives. If they turn against their own side, as in the case of the ex-Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spy Robert Hanssen, they often appear to do so for reasons which have little to do with ideology.⁴² Without reliable data, it is difficult to draw defensible conclusions about the effectiveness of propaganda efforts on target populations which are already intellectually and emotionally committed to another cause. Undecided minds are another matter. Hence, if one party is waging a concerted information campaign, the other can hardly avoid doing likewise. Silence suggests weakness, guilt, or both.

The ideological wars referred to above were resolved either by a major physical event, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, or by other kinds of force. The inquisitions detained individuals by force, and extracted confessions, again usually by physical or emotional force. This was also true of McCarthy's more secular brand of inquisition. That Hitler, Stalin, and Mao used force in their ideological struggles is patently obvious, though one would expect that when ideas are used to support military action. This is not to say that propaganda in the form of leaflets, radio broadcasts, and the like, are not effective in getting opponents to surrender or that they have no value. Rather, it is easy to overlook the amount and type of psychological or emotional force they can bring to bear.

Advertising Campaigns.

Advertising campaigns are arguably the most pervasive, and thus the most common, wars of ideas. An advertising campaign is a series of messages, often packaged as sound-bites or slogans, carrying a central idea about a person, place, or a thing. The objective of the campaign, of course, is to get the audience to take a desired action, to vote for a particular candidate, to visit

a certain place, or to buy a specific product. According to one source, some of the most successful advertising campaigns in the United States include: Nike, "Just Do It" (1988); Miller Lite, "Tastes great, less filling" (1974); Avis, "We try harder" (1963); Maxwell House, "Good to the last drop" (1959); U.S. Army, "Be all that you can be" (1981); and Burger King, "Have it your way" (1973).⁴³ With but few exceptions, many of these slogans are still in use, which is obviously evidence of their effectiveness.

Stakes in this sort of war of ideas are relatively high, from the political success of a candidate to an increase in market share for a manufacturer or a vendor. A classic example is the ongoing war of slogans and images between Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola. Each uses a combination of slogans, images, and celebrities in an attempt to convince consumers that its product tastes better and is more refreshing. These "Cola Wars" have raged for several decades, with each producer developing new flavors and marketing strategies. The most important of these was Coca-Cola's effort to provide a cheap and steady supply of bottled Coke to men and women serving in the military during World War II. This strategy resulted in millions of servicemen and women returning to the United States with an acquired taste for Coca-Cola, and in a global bottling and distribution network. Another notable marketing move was Coca-Cola's use of the song, "I'd like to teach the world to sing . . ." in the early 1970s; the song, connected with images of people of all races and nationalities joining hand-in-hand, proved an instant success, offering hope in politically uncertain times. Another success, the "Pepsi Challenge," was initiated by Pepsi-Cola in 1975, in which individuals took blind taste-tests and selected the product they

preferred. Pepsi was purportedly chosen a majority of the time. Yet, while Pepsi's sales increased through this and other clever strategies, it has never been able to overtake Coke in terms of market share. The Coca-Cola logo has become associated internationally with all things American, good and bad. In 2006, Coca-Cola products still held 43 percent of the market share for carbonated soft drinks in the United States, while Pepsi-Cola products held 31 percent.⁴⁴

Advertising campaigns must continue as long as a product can be expected to be sold for a profit, or a candidate is running for office. To be sure, the campaigns themselves evolve (or devolve) over time, responding to changing situations and to actions taken by the competition. However, they retain their basic characteristic, which is the intrinsic drive for larger market share, whether that consists of consumers or voters. Significantly, Coca-Cola's relative edge over Pepsi-Cola has as much to do with the former's aggressive exploitation of physical events unrelated to the taste of its products, such as military deployments overseas, world sporting events such as the Olympics, and providing a message of hope in troubled times.

WARS OF IDEAS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

This brief discussion of wars of ideas reveals, first of all, that they do not occur in isolation from physical events, but rather turn on them. Physically eliminating, driving away, or otherwise neutralizing a party's key proponents is only one, albeit the most obvious, way to resolve such a conflict. Augustine leveraged the power of the pope to achieve such an outcome in the battle with Pelagius. As the example of the collapse of the Soviet Union shows, a major event – such as an internal

coup, economic collapse, or natural disaster—can also bring about the demise of one party, or its credibility, and thus resolve or at least marginalize a war of ideas. Deliberately connecting a negative event to a “failed” set of ideas is thus another way to gain an important advantage in a conflict. It might not matter that the connection does not hold up to close scrutiny; the audience might not require a high standard of proof if the outcome is desirable. The West was eager to believe, albeit with some justification, the explanation that the Soviet Union collapsed because the strategy of containment worked. To be sure, socialism has hardly been extinguished as a school of thought. Still, the failure of the Soviet experiment seriously compromised the ideology’s basic tenets, and it is now much less powerful.

It is unlikely that the inquisitions of the Catholic church or the loyalty review boards of McCarthy would have been taken seriously without some legal, moral, or physical force to back them. At the same time, it is not clear that any “confessions” extracted by the threat of force have ever been truly reliable. While force can play an important role in any battle of ideas, it can also lead to results that are superficial or counterproductive. Of course, that raises the question as to whether the “confession” was the ultimate purpose, or whether the war of ideas was only intended to support the use of force in the first place.

The survey also suggests that wars of ideas can fade into irrelevance for at least some period of time. Participants might have their interests taken up by other matters, perhaps another debate or a catastrophic physical event. Or, the next generation might have different tastes and concerns, and thus might not consider a particular battle of ideas worth its time. It is,

to be sure, to avoid such outcomes that advertising and recruiting campaigns transform themselves to ensure that they retain their appeal in ever changing markets. Yet, such efforts must run continuously, and should involve extensive market research.

Many wars of ideas will continue indefinitely, evolving into different forms with varying intensities, to be fought out by later generations. The debates between Pro-Life and Pro-Choice constituencies have raged for decades, and will likely continue for decades more.⁴⁵ New evidence may be presented, or new tactics tried, but at root, this debate will involve many of the same issues for years. Similarly, we could make a case that the battle between Augustine and Pelagius represents but a single episode in a longer dispute over contrasting views of human nature. None of this, of course, mattered to either Augustine or Pelagius at the time. In short, the old adage is true that ideas – like diseases – never really die, only the vectors do.

“The War of Ideas.”

The battle of ideas in the war on terror is a complex mixture of two types of conflicts, one external and the other internal. Externally, this war is an ideological struggle between the West, and in particular the United States, and terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda and its spin-offs. The aim of the United States is to render al-Qaeda a negligible threat. For al-Qaeda, it is an effort to undermine the West’s support for moderate Islamic regimes, and to prevent its secular ways from corrupting Islam. To be sure, the ideas at odds here vary among those participating in, or describing, the conflict.⁴⁶ That is to be expected in a battle of ideas, since competing parties will often use otherwise unrelated images, concepts, and slogans to support their causes.

Internally, this war is a battle over religious dogma within Islam. It is a struggle to establish a particularly militant interpretation of the Koran and of *shari'a* law, which would mobilize Muslims against the West, and thus lead to the purification of Islamic society and resurrect the greatness of the Caliphate.

As Akbar Ahmed, a Muslim scholar who holds the Chair of Islamic Studies at American University, explains:

Properly understood, this is a war of ideas within Islam — some of them faithful to authentic Islam, but some of them clearly un-Islamic and even blasphemous toward the peaceful and compassionate Allah of the *Qur'an*.⁴⁷

Other Islamic scholars and Muslim organizations have agreed, some explicitly condemning bin Laden as an “apostate.”⁴⁸ In addition, some Muslim leaders have openly denounced the threat Takfiri and Salafi jihadism poses:

[Saudi youth have become] a tool in the hands of foreign forces that manipulate them in the name of jihad, whilst fulfilling their shameful goals and objectives in foul operations that are far removed from religion so that our youth have become a commodity to be bought and sold.⁴⁹

Either we will have in the next 10 years 80 million productive young people . . . or we will have 80 million radical extremists in the Middle East.⁵⁰

In addition, other Muslim authorities have challenged key al-Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, to debate religious issues.⁵¹ The internal struggle is one that only Muslims can wage; non-Muslims may assist in some ways, when asked, but

they surely have no authority – and, thus, no right – to opine on matters of dogma. The quotes above suggest that Islam is in the midst of a revivalist or reformation-counter-reformation dynamic that will have to run its course.

In contrast, the external struggle involves both Muslims and non-Muslims; the tactics of these self-styled Takfiri or Salafist jihadis virtually ensure that. So, the central question for American policymakers becomes how the United States and its strategic partners might wage the external ideological battle without unnecessarily complicating Islam's internal struggle. Revivalist movements have come and gone throughout history, with most lasting but a few decades, and the more violent ones less than that. It is possible, then, that the so-called Salafi jihadi movement will also eventually burn itself out, even if a small core of zealots manages to survive.⁵² Just as some wars of ideas end when people lose interest in them, so Muslim youths might also lose interest in this movement, seeing it as the dead-end it literally is, and turn their minds and bodies toward more fruitful endeavors. Indeed, as some scholars have pointed out, the "future of the region belongs to young Muslims," and, thus, the United States would do well to consider how its policies and actions will affect them.⁵³

Of course, the motives in each of these conflicts are more than ideological. One former terrorist confessed that he found the idea of a quick and sure path to paradise via martyrdom attractive: "The idea of dying as a martyr provided a perfect escape from the frightening anguish of eternal punishment."⁵⁴ Significantly, this individual emphasized the "idea of dying as a martyr" over other potential motives. Similarly, other testimonies place less stress on the

image of Islam under assault, the presumed rallying cry of many Salafist jihadis, than they do on a certain lust for violence—as evidenced by the popularity of video camera recordings of car bombings and other attacks.⁵⁵ This emphasis suggests that an adolescent desiring to act out violent fantasies may in part account for the recent popularity of some forms of jihadism, with the rallying cry merely providing social justification for other destructive impulses.⁵⁶ Still other scholars point out that the motives for some terrorists are rooted in small-group dynamics rather than lofty ideological aims, while admitting that a vague vision of creating a Salafi state does seem to hold al-Qaeda and some of its emergent offshoots together.⁵⁷ Yet other scholars warn that economic, social, political, and cultural conditions cannot be ruled out.⁵⁸ In any case, the point is that the motives of leaders may well differ significantly from those of the foot soldiers. Oversimplifying the problem is, thus, likely to lead to a flawed strategy.

Diverging Approaches?

There are two principal schools of thought on how to approach the war of ideas. The first approach advocates treating the conflict as a matter best addressed through public diplomacy—defined as the conveyance of information across a broad spectrum to include cultural affairs and political action. Accordingly, this view calls for revitalizing or transforming the U.S. Department of State and many of the traditional tools of statecraft.⁵⁹ This school of thought contends, and justly, that American public diplomacy declined after the Cold War, as evidenced by the demise of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, and the reduction or elimination of strategic communications programs

such as “Voice of America,” and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The remedy, then, according to this view, is to re-engage the world, especially the Arab-Muslim world, by revitalizing both the form and content of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic communications, and by reinforcing those communications with concrete programs that invest in people, create opportunities for positive exchanges, and help build friendships. In fact, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and its Iraqi component, Radio Free Iraq, and Al-Hurra TV are now actively participating in U.S. strategic communication efforts, though with debatable effectiveness; all this has occurred, in part, by taking resources from Voice of America.⁶⁰

Some experts characterize this approach as attempting to win the “hearts and minds of Muslims worldwide.”⁶¹ However, this characterization is counterproductive, implying that the United States is trying to convert Muslims. That apprehension, in turn, plays into the hands of violent extremists who claim their religion and way of life are under attack. Simply put, this approach is an advertising campaign, though it strives to be more than that by promoting real investments in people and in genuine cultural exchanges, such as the revival of the Fulbright Scholarship Program and the creation of the Global Cultural Initiative.⁶² The objective of this advertising campaign is to “sell” America rather than to convert others, though there is a fine line between convincing people to “buy” into an idea, and converting them. This approach is also an important attempt to employ more than military tools in the war on terror. As officials and analysts have repeatedly noted, “soft” power matters.⁶³ Yet, it seems the means for employing soft power are inadequate.

In direct contrast, the second school of thought advocates treating the war of ideas as a “real war,” wherein the objective is to destroy the influence and credibility of the opposing ideology, to include neutralizing its chief proponents.⁶⁴ This approach sees public diplomacy as an essential, but insufficient tool because it requires too much time to achieve desired results, and does little to aid the immediate efforts of combat forces in the field. For this school of thought, the principal focus of the war of ideas ought to be how to use the ways and means of information warfare to eliminate terrorist groups. In the words of one advocate of this view:

We seek an unashamedly offensive strategy to take and hold the initiative in the war of ideas. This information offensive is fought not as one would conduct diplomacy, but as one would wage true warfare: a political and psychological strategy not just to undermine the enemy but to help our diplomats and combat forces destroy it.⁶⁵

It is worth reiterating that this view does not consider the former school’s emphasis on public diplomacy to be wrong, only too limited in terms of the tools it employs and too passive in nature. Instead, this view maintains that what is needed is an acknowledgment that the war of ideas is a genuine and serious war with considerable stakes, and that winning it requires much more than the restoration of public diplomacy, however robust that restoration turns out to be. Second, it urges that the United States and its friends and allies adopt information strategies that are more aggressive. Such strategies would use “words as weapons,” redefine concepts in ways the enemy cannot exploit, “brand” and “ridicule” the views of the foe, and “overwhelm him with images and narratives too numerous to

counter.”⁶⁶ It especially stresses more extensive use of information-age technologies, such as the internet, to block or disrupt jihadist recruiting and propaganda efforts.⁶⁷ In short, this approach treats the war of ideas as a classic ideological struggle, but wants to wage it with newer information warfare tools and techniques, combined with kinetic force where appropriate.

Indeed, substantial evidence supports this view. As one American who has worked in information operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan recently reported:

The [U.S.-led] coalition [in Iraq] has failed to counter enemy propaganda either by responding rapidly with effective counter messages or by proactively challenging the messages, methods, and ideology that the insurgents and extremists promote and exploit. . . . while the coalition fumbles its information operations, the insurgents and militia groups are adept at releasing timely messages to undermine support for the Iraqi government and bolster their own perceived potency. They are quick to exploit coalition failures and excesses; they respond rapidly to defend their own actions, often by shifting blame to the authorities; and they hijack coalition successes to argue that change only occurs as a result of their violence. The slow speed of the U.S. military’s clearance process—typically it takes 3 to 5 days to approve even a simple information operations product such as a leaflet or billboard—creates an information vacuum that Iraqis fill with conspiracy theories and gossip often reflecting the exaggerations or outright lies of insurgents and extremists.⁶⁸

Extremists have also purportedly identified influential columnists and academics “with email addresses,” such as Thomas Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, and Samuel Huntington, as targets for their public relations campaigns.⁶⁹ The value of the internet

has already been well-documented: websites and chat rooms provide violent extremists with the necessary grist to concoct moral and theological justifications for their crimes, as well as the training and instruction needed to execute them.⁷⁰ Its use continues to expand, fostered in part by young Muslims who appear to be acting independently, as the result of inspiration rather than direction.⁷¹

Their differences notwithstanding, these two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Much of the language in the new *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (NSPDSC) supports both, though it is explicitly weighted toward the former.⁷² The NSPDSC establishes three strategic objectives for public diplomacy: (1) to offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity rooted in “our most basic values”; (2) to isolate and marginalize violent extremists; and (3) to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths across the world.⁷³ Notably, the document offers two ways to accomplish the second objective: (1) isolating and discrediting terrorist leaders, facilitators, and organizations; and (2) delegitimizing terror as an acceptable tactic to achieve political ends. Clearly, these ways, or methods, are in alignment with the second approach.

Still, while these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, they are not entirely compatible either. They represent two different perspectives: the former accords with the views of the U.S. Department of State, which sees the main effort as the reshaping of the image of the United States through “outreach.” The second approach is in line with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), which sees the objective as the actual elimination of a threatening ideology. This task, according to one expert, “cannot be run out of the State

Department," since "diplomats by their purpose and training are not warriors and should not be expected to become warriors."⁷⁴ By the same logic, however, it would seem that warriors, by their purpose and training, are not well-suited to engage in outreach with foreign cultures, aside from military-to-military contacts. Yet, this is precisely the role in which they often find themselves. So, the logic above does not necessarily hold, even if the recommendation might.

Nor is it desirable to subordinate one department to another in this case. Either the restoration of public diplomacy will proceed too slowly, or the isolation and neutralization of terrorist leaders will not occur quickly enough. The solution recently recommended by the Defense Science Board (2008), namely, creating a "permanent strategic communication structure within the White House," has potential.⁷⁵ However, some caution is warranted as the U.S. strategic effort cannot afford to add yet another layer of bureaucratic oversight to a structure and a process that are already painfully slow and reticent to act. The speed of information in today's strategic environment underscores the need not only for rapid, decentralized responses, but also for preemptive or anticipatory measures. The State Department and DoD are organized more with accountability than efficiency in mind. U.S. leadership at all levels is answerable for its actions in ways that its opponents are not; but, the need for accountability fuels a tendency to exercise tighter control, especially in fluid environments. That, in turn, works against rapid responsiveness or preemption. Thus, the goal of creating a permanent strategic communication structure must be to facilitate White House leadership and direction, rather than to add further impediments to the flow of information.

Moreover, neither department has sponsored a concerted effort to understand wars of ideas as such. While, as we have said, the State Department endeavors to change the U.S. image from malevolent to benevolent, such efforts ought to occur whether or not the United States is involved in a war. They should, in fact, never end. Opinions are fleeting things requiring constant cultivation.⁷⁶ As one expert testified: "U.S. earthquake relief efforts doubled the percentage of Pakistanis with favorable views of the U.S. from 23 percent to 46 percent from May 2005 to November 2005. This figure had dropped to 27 percent by 2006, however."⁷⁷ Also, as the "Cola Wars" illustrate, advertising campaigns should expect to run indefinitely. The goal is not just that consumers should drink Coke instead of Pepsi or another brand, but that they should drink it regularly. Campaign efforts must persist because when they fail to do so, they give rise to uncomfortable questions about a product's long-term viability.

While proponents of the second approach see the war of ideas as an ideological struggle, they do not address how to avoid inflicting "collateral" damage on Islam as a religion and a way of life. By comparison, the possibility of inflicting collateral damage on the ideology of socialism was hardly a concern during the Cold War. An aggressive campaign to debase and delegitimize al-Qaeda leaders and their ideas must avoid inadvertently striking core religious or cultural values, which might in turn lend credence to the claim that the West is attacking Islam. The violent reaction to the cartoons that appeared in the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, in September 2005, shows that extremists will move quickly and ruthlessly to exploit certain messages and images, regardless of their content or the author's intent. The problem is that information

warfare is not as precise as conventional wisdom would have us believe. The many and various tools of the information age almost guarantee that words and images are, at best, only blunt instruments. The ways in which information can be spun have multiplied considerably, thereby increasing the “damage radius” of words and ideas.

The second approach rightly sees the war of ideas as a clash of opposing wills. However, this clash is not simply binary in nature. During the Cold War, it was reasonable to expect that third parties would be receptive to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic communications. That is not necessarily the case today. As mentioned previously, an overwhelming majority of Muslims might not want to join a Salafist global jihad; but they might find some U.S. policies openly hostile, and might actively resist U.S. communication efforts as a result. Accordingly, U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must have a more precise goal than improving America’s image: it must continue to discourage young Muslims from joining al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates. Winning a popularity contest is far less important than undermining al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit. The two aims are eminently separable, and conflating them only creates confusion.

Fortunately, the brutal methods of al-Qaeda and its affiliates are helping Coalition efforts in the battle of ideas. As recent polls have shown, support of suicide bombing and other violent tactics is declining among some Muslim populations; this drop off is partly due to the extreme methods employed by al-Qaeda.⁷⁸ Some Sunni militias have distanced themselves from al-Qaeda in Iraq, and groups of “Concerned Local Citizens” (CLCs) have emerged not only to compete for resources locally, but also to help combat al-Qaeda’s influence.⁷⁹

The hotel bombings in Amman motivated the Jordanian government to take more aggressive action in its own war against terror.⁸⁰ Again, these developments have occurred partly because of al-Qaeda's ruthless use of terror tactics against other Muslims. While al-Qaeda's propaganda paints the war on terror as a crusade against Islam, and publishes images of coalition troops being attacked, the reality is that far more Muslims than non-Muslims have been killed and injured by its violent tactics.⁸¹ That knowledge is becoming more widespread; U.S. strategy should help spread it even farther, and it should encourage peaceful political activism as an alternative to violent extremism.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- U.S. strategy for the war of ideas must be more sensitive to the opportunities and pitfalls introduced by physical events. The incidents at Abu Ghraib, which were extremely harmful to coalition efforts, would pale in comparison to a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders have already purportedly declared victory in Iraq based on their skewed interpretations of U.S. opinion polls and of election campaign rhetoric regarding troop withdrawals.⁸² Conversely, the successful stabilization of those states would have an extremely positive effect on the war of ideas, undercutting al-Qaeda's general information campaign. This is not to say that U.S. forces must remain committed in large numbers in both countries irrespective of progress, or despite the emergence of other strategic challenges. However, it does mean

that winning the war of ideas will become much more difficult, and the damage to America's image much more severe, if the withdrawal of Coalition forces is perceived as premature. To be sure, terrorists will attempt to spin any Coalition withdrawal as a strategic failure, regardless of the circumstances under which it occurs. However, that spin will have greater potential of backfiring if indigenous forces can continue to provide effective security in the wake of any departure of coalition troops.

- Neither the Department of State's approach nor that of DoD should be subordinated to the other. Rather, the United States should pursue both approaches in parallel. Public diplomacy efforts should be expanded with the aim of restoring America's image, and that endeavor should continue indefinitely, whether or not the United States is at war. The State Department should also expand and enhance its current communication efforts with new methods and technologies. Some analysts suggest that any tendency to control the message too tightly is counterproductive to U.S. communication efforts; they suggest an "evolutionary" approach, modifying messages and techniques as the situation dictates.⁸³ This is only one possible innovation; whether or not it succeeds, the point is that the United States can explore different messages and techniques with minimal risk in most cases.
- Concurrently, DoD should concentrate its efforts on defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates militarily. Admittedly, terrorist organizations can change their names, but that, too, is a victory of sorts. Moreover, even with altered names, many of the key network nodes and links will remain

operative, thus allowing for the finessing of those organizations. In any case, this tighter focus would help establish some parameters for the war of ideas; it would also facilitate the isolation and neutralization of al-Qaeda leaders, as well as lend some clarity to America's larger strategic intentions. To that end, DoD organizations should receive resources commensurate with the mission of prosecuting the war of ideas as a war. The number of religious and cultural experts available to the Deputy Directorate for the War on Terrorism (DDWOT/J-5), for instance, should be increased.

- DoD should also sponsor a series of studies and conferences exploring wars of ideas farther so as to promote a better understanding of their principal types and range of outcomes. If recent wars are any indication, the U.S. military will encounter similar information operations in future conflicts. In many respects, this war is a testing ground for a host of rapidly evolving information-age tools and techniques. However, the lessons gleaned from this conflict will be incomplete if they are not also accompanied with a better appreciation of wars of ideas as a mode of conflict.
- Armed with this knowledge, the U.S. military must consider revising its corpus of doctrine pertaining to information operations. Joint doctrine is reasonably comprehensive in terms of addressing information operations, to include sub- and related categories such as psychological operations and military deception.⁸⁴ However, the chief assumption underpinning each of these documents is that information operations support (kinetic) military operations. That is

true in many types of conflicts. However, in other cases, particularly the current war of ideas, this relationship is reversed: military operations need to support information operations. Al-Qaeda and other jihadi organizations are not fighting a new kind of war, but instead are subordinating their military operations to a well-crafted information campaign designed to exploit certain cultural and religious values. All Joint and service publications pertaining to information operations should be revised to incorporate those wars where military operations are conducted in support of a larger information campaign. Put differently, U.S. military doctrine must broaden its view of the relationship between kinetic and information operations.

- Furthermore, doctrine concerning information operations must be revised to reflect the reality that the “information environment” is neither neutral nor static. Disparate cultural and social influences almost ensure that diverse audiences will interpret the same information differently. Even within that variegated landscape, the meanings of images, concepts, and visions are often bitterly contested. It is almost impossible to interpret information objectively because the very tools needed for interpretation in the first place are derived from subjective experiences and structures of meaning. In many cases, enough commonalities exist to allow at least a baseline of communication to take place. Yet, an important assumption underpinning U.S. doctrine on information operations is that all audiences will essentially draw the desirable

conclusion, if given enough of the “right” information. This assumption overlooks how various cultures assess information depending on the sources. Simply put, “right” appears differently to diverse audiences. While we would expect our opponents to spin information to their advantage, even so-called neutral populations are not necessarily impartial when it comes to interpreting information offered by either side.

- The U.S. military already understands, at least in theory, that successful information operations require a working understanding of target cultures. It needs more resources to put theory into practice, however. For that reason, the U.S. Army’s new Human Terrain System (HTS) is an important step in the right direction.⁸⁵ The mission of the HTS is to provide commanders information on local social groups and their interests, beliefs, leaders, and on the basic drivers of individual and group behaviors. Clearly, this kind of information is invaluable in stability operations and counterinsurgency operations where interaction with the indigenous population is both frequent and vital. The most critical part of the system is the Human Terrain Team (HTT), which consists of five personnel: a team leader, two social scientists, a research manager, and an analyst. A preliminary assessment of the contributions of an HTT in Afghanistan was positive.⁸⁶ But, more HTTs appear to be needed. Assuming subsequent assessments of HTTs are also positive, the Army should seriously consider expanding the HTS and making it more robust.

The HTS is one concrete way of putting useful cultural and social information in the hands of those at the sharp end. It also provides the Army with a vehicle for optimizing the use of personnel with valuable cultural knowledge and language skills. Thus, the Army should consider increasing the number of HTTs to perhaps as many as one per battalion, and placing a general officer in charge of the overall system to give it more heft. Consideration should also be given to placing them at combatant command level to assist in the development of security cooperation plans. Personnel assignment and assessment policies will also have to be aligned to reward leaders appropriately, and to help grow officers and noncommissioned officers with relevant cultural knowledge and other expertise. To be sure, supplying enough qualified personnel to meet the demand will remain a major challenge. Nonetheless, recent successes in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that taking such measures will pay important dividends in future conflicts.

As we have seen, wars of ideas, regardless of type, are often serious matters. The stakes can run quite high, and the consequences of failure can be severe, regardless of how little shooting is involved. Just as ideas require carriers or vectors, so wars of ideas turn on physical events. Our approach to such wars must always take that into account. By understanding wars of ideas as a mode of conflict, we can fight the current battle of ideas more effectively, while at the same time better preparing ourselves to wage future ones. We have much more to learn about such conflicts than this brief survey can capture. One point is clear: our efforts

to understand wars of ideas must rival our endeavors to grasp other forms of conflict; otherwise our knowledge of warfare will remain regrettably incomplete.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Regan, "Experts: US Must Win 'War of Ideas'," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 16, 2006, www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/dailyupdate.html; see "Terrorism Index," *Foreign Policy Review*, July/August 2006, web1.foreignpolicy.com/issue_julyaug_2006/TI-index/index.html.

2. The White House, *United States National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC, March 2006, p. 9.

3. The White House, *United States National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington, DC, September 2006, p. 7.

4. The White House, *United States National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington, DC, October 5, 2007, p. 15.

5. National Public Radio, "Interview of the National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley," July 13, 2007; www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070713-6.html.

6. See Daniel L. Davis, "The Battle of Ideas: U.S. Losing in Recent Years," *Washington Times*, January 1, 2008; William Matthews, "Rumsfeld: U.S. Needs Online Strategic-Communications Agency," *DefenseNews.com*, January 23, 2008; and anonymous, "Rumsfeld: U.S. Losing War of Ideas," which captures former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's statement in March 2006: "If I were grading I would say we probably deserve a 'D' or a 'D-plus' as a country as to how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place in the world today." See www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/27/terror/main1442811.shtml.

7. Haya El Nasser, "American Muslims Reject Extremes: Survey Notes Contrasts on Iraq War, Role of Faith," *USA Today*, May 23, 2007, p. 1; Alexandra Marks, "Radical Islam Finds US Sterile Ground," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 23, 2006, reports similar findings from a 2004 Zogby survey.

8. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate, "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States, April 2006," lists "pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims" as one of four underlying factors the so-called jihadists exploit; yet, the same document states that the "ultra-conservative interpretation of *shari'a*-based governance" is unpopular with the "vast majority of Muslims." Thus, it is possible to harbor anti-American sentiments without wanting to become a jihadist.

9. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, p. 15.

10. In fact, numerous wars of ideas have been underway. George Packer, ed., *The Fight is for Democracy: Winning the War of Ideas in America and the World*, New York: Harper Collins, 2003, p. 14.

11. Histories have their problems, but they offer a place to start; see Antulio J. Echevarria II, "The Trouble with History," *Parameters*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 78-90.

12. I have borrowed here from Clausewitz's construct which describes the nature of war in terms of three dynamic tendencies: hostility, chance, and purpose.

13. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, and Paul Paret, *Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, explores the use of propaganda posters in Russia, Central and Western Europe, and the United States from the turn of the century to the aftermath of World War II; the posters form a bridge between the claims of ideology and the state on the one hand and the support or submission of millions of men and women on the other.

14. This military presence undoubtedly helped prevent hardcore believers from regaining political influence. In Germany, for instance, committed Nazis continued to resist well into 1946. Stephen G. Fritz, *Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich*, Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

15. For an introduction to post-structuralism, see Paul Harrison, "Post-structuralist Theories," in S. Aitken and G.

Valentine, eds., *Approaches to Human Geography*, London: Sage, 2006, pp. 122-135.

16. The following website chronicles the violence inflicted on physicians and medical staff: www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/murders.asp.

17. Donald T. Chrichtlow, *The Politics of Abortion and Birth Control in Historical Perspective*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1996; James C. Mohr, *Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900*, New York: Oxford University, 1978.

18. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, New York: Cambridge University, 1996; Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1991; Clifford Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.

19. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd Ed., Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1996.

20. Brian Magee, *Popper*, London: Collins, 1973; Karl R. Popper, *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972; and *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Routledge, 2006, published in 1935 as *Logik der Forschung*. Karl Popper also advanced the view that even objective knowledge is tentative, and thus any theory purporting to embody it is also of necessity tentative, that is, contingent on the discovery of new objective knowledge, which might expand or transform the original objective knowledge.

21. Mike Weiss, "War of Ideas Fought in a Small-town Courtroom: Intelligent Design Theory vs. the Science of Evolution at Center of Pennsylvania Trial," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 6, 2005, p. A-1.

22. "Judge Rules Against 'Intelligent Design': Religious Alternative to Evolution Barred from Public-School Science Classes," Associated Press, December 20, 2005.

23. Nicholas Copernicus, *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, Edmund Rosen, trans., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1992; Edward Rosen, *Copernicus and the Scientific Revolution*, Malabar: Robert E. Krieger, 1984; Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1957; Maurice A. Finocchiaro, ed., *The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History*, Berkeley: University of California, 1989; Annibale Fantoli, *Galileo – For Copernicanism and the Church*, 3rd English ed., Notre Dame, IN: Vatican, 2003.

24. Michael Sharratt, *Galileo: Decisive Innovator*, Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996.

25. "The Galileo Controversy," www.catholic.com/library/Galileo_controversy.asp.

26. Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945: Nature as Model and Nature as Threat*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

27. Bart D. Ehrman, *Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew*, Oxford: Oxford University, 2003, examines several forged or falsified Christian texts.

28. Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, Berkley: University of California, 1969, pp. 365-374, provides an excellent summary and analysis of the ideas of and political struggle between Augustine and Pelagius; Gareth B. Matthews, *Augustine*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005; James J. O'Donnell, *Augustine: A New Biography*, New York: HarperCollins, 2005.

29. In fact, Augustine's views on free will are much more complex than can be covered here. In *On Free Choice of the Will*, for instance, he stated: "For sin is that which you gave us when you granted us free choice of will." *Augustine: On Free Choice of the Will*, Thomas Williams, ed. and trans., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.

30. Brown, *Augustine*, p. 374.

31. Compare: Anna Simmons, "Making Enemies, Part Two," *The American Interest*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Autumn 2006, pp. 35-45. For a view that treats religion as an ideology, see Johnathan Fine, "Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 59-69.

32. Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror*, New York: HarperCollins, 2006, adds an interesting twist, equating 20th-century ideologies, such as fascism and socialism, to secular religions.

33. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, New York: Penguin, 2005.

34. Scholars credit the papacy with the first modern use of the term propaganda when, in the midst of the Thirty Years' War, it created the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) in 1622. This office was charged with the "systematic dissemination of ideas designed to influence public opinion." Lynette Finch, "Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First Half of the Twentieth Century," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 2000, pp. 367-386. Since World War I, however, the term propaganda has assumed a pejorative, almost sinister meaning, particularly among liberal democracies which tend to associate it with manipulation of the media, public deception, and social conditioning. Dennis M. Murphy and James F. White, "Propaganda: Can a Word Decide a War?" *Parameters*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 15-27, provides a brief historical survey of the U.S. Government's attempts to employ information warfare, or propaganda, as an integral part of armed conflict since World War I.

35. David Edmonds and John Eidinow, *Bobby Fischer Goes to War: How the Soviets Lost the Most Extraordinary Chess Match of All Time*, New York: HarperCollins, 2004, describes the match within the context of the Cold War; Rene Chun, "Bobby Fischer's Pathetic Endgame: Paranoia, Hubris, and Hatred – The Unraveling of the Greatest Chess Player Ever," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 2002, describes the escalating paranoia and anti-Semitism of Bobby Fischer, www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200212/chun.

36. Albert Fried, *McCarthyism, The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

37. Bernard Hamilton, *The Medieval Inquisition*, London: E. Arnold, 1981; Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision*, New Haven: Yale University, 2006; Edward Peters, *Inquisition*, Berkeley: University of California, 1989.

38. See, especially, Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition*.

39. Carnes Lord and Helle Dale, "Public Diplomacy and the Cold War: Lessons Learned," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, September 18, 2007; James Carafano, *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom*, Washington, DC: Heritage, 2005. Ehsan M. Ahrari, "Why the Long War Can and Cannot be Compared to the Cold War," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2007, pp. 275-284, offers some cautions. Others suggest that comparing the "long war" to the Cold War merely offers "Washington a dominant, unifying idea that would enable it to reassert and legitimize its leadership of global security." Barry Buzan, "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6, Nov 2006, pp. 1101-1118; still others suggest that the United States must be concerned with multiple "long wars," Makubin T. Owens, "America's 'Long War(s)'," Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 10, 2008, www.fpri.org.

40. National Intelligence Estimate, April 2006.

41. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992*, 7th Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, argues that the collapse was both a cause and effect of the deep-seated structural problems in the Soviet system; others contend, with some justification, that military spending in an effort to keep up with the West also played a role.

42. A number of spies, such as ex-DIA analyst Ana Montes, have betrayed the United States, but were already committed to another cause. Scott W. Carmichael, *True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba's Master Spy*, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2007.

43. "Top 100 Advertising Campaigns"; adage.com/century/campaigns.html.

44. These percentages include all Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola beverages. *Beverage Digest*, Vol. 50, No. 5, March 8, 2007, www.beverage-digest.com/pdf/top-10_2007.pdf. The recent increase in sales of bottled water suggests that both Coke and Pepsi have another competitor.

45. Pamela Constable, "Movement Gets a Youthful Infusion: A New Generation of Activists is Assembling across College Campuses," *Washington Post*, January 21, 2008, p. B04.

46. Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 162, suggests it is a clash between democratic and anti-democratic views. Others compare radical Islamist terrorists to the Fascists and Communists before them, since none of them could allow alternative value systems to exist in areas they control. Douglas J. Macdonald, *The New Totalitarians: Social Identities and Radical Islamist Political Grand Strategy*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.

47. Cited from J. Michael Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists*, Washington, DC: The Institute of World Politics Press, 2007, p. 68. William Rosenau, "Waging the War of Ideas," <http://rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1218>.

48. Those organizations include The Organization of the Islamic Conference, The Free Muslims Coalition, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim Council of Britain, and the Islamic Conference of Spain, www.freemuslims.org; www.masnet.org; www.mcb.org.uk. Similar comments dating back to September 12, 2001, can be accessed at www.unc.edu/~kurzman/terror.htm. www.oic-oci.org/press/english, and *Khaleej Times Online*, July 20, 2005, www.khaleejtimes.com. It is not clear, however, to what extent these organizations can speak for a Muslim community that is marked by significant divisions, and is increasingly frustrated by the "failure to move beyond rhetoric," Shahram Akbarzadeh and Kylie Connor, "The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Sharing an Illusion," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer

2005, pp. 79-92. The question, of course, is to what extent these pronouncements have reduced the appeal of the jihadi movement among Muslim youths, which is extremely difficult to measure.

49. Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Addulaziz al-Sheikh, *Asharq Alawsat*, October 2, 2007; cited from "War on Terror Notes: Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism," October 5, 2007.

50. Mohammed Al Gergawi, Cabinet Affairs Minister, United Arab Emirates, *Financial Times*, September 28, 2007; cited from "War on Terror Notes," October 5, 2007.

51. An example is the Saudi government's Anti-Extremism Campaign, cited from "War on Terror Notes," January 4, 2008.

52. While the salafi jihadi movement can be considered global in some respects, we should not forget that it is made up of regional or local movements, several of which have been blunted or aborted. David Cook, Jarret Brachman and Chris Heffelfinger, eds., *Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements*, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, 2007.

53. Alan Richards, *Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. Among other things, this monograph underscores the importance of the current "youth bulge" in the Middle East. Notably, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center reveals that "Muslims between the ages of 18 and 29 express significantly greater acceptance than older people of suicide bombings in some cases." Nasser, "American Muslims," p. 1.

54. Tawfid Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadist's Mind," *Current Trends in Muslim Ideology*, Vol. 5, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, April 6, 2007, www.futureofmuslimworld.com.

55. The testimonies of some young bloggers are revealing; see Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers," *International Herald Tribune*, October 14, 2007. The images used cover a broad gamut, see Jarret Brachman and Lianne Kennedy Boudali, eds., *The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda*, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, March 2006.

56. For more on the problem of adolescence and violence, see Simmons, "Making Enemies."

57. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; and *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.

58. Richards, *Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism?*

59. Owen Barron, "A New Approach: Engaging the Muslim World through Public Diplomacy," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 30-34; Carnes Lord, *Losing Hearts and Minds? Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror*, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 7; Robert Satloff, *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004.

60. Lisa Curtis, "Efforts to Deal with America's Image Abroad: Are They Working?" Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, April 26, 2007, p. 6. Voice of America now broadcasts daily in 44 languages, see www.voanews.com; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org; Radio Free Iraq now broadcasts 17 hours per day, and maintains an active website: www.iraqhurr.org.

61. Satloff, *Battle of Ideas*, p. 49.

62. Curtis, "America's Image Abroad," p. 3.

63. Michael Chertoff, "Make No Mistake: This is War," *Washington Post*, April 22, 2007, p. B7. See also the speech by Ambassador Dell Daily, Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating Terrorism," *Policy Watch*, No. 1321, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 18, 2007.

64. Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas*; Zeyno Baran, "Fighting the War of Ideas," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 6, November/December 2005, pp. 68-78.

65. Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas*, p. 16.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

67. Mark Burgess, "Policing Terrorism on the Internet," Center for Defense Information, December 18, 2007; Roderick Jones and Michael Schrage, "Counterterrorism Blog: Jihadinets," December 17, 2007. Of course, some efforts at disruption are already underway. Audrey Hudson, "Blogs Target Jihadis Online: Force Servers to Close Sites," *Washington Times*, October 10, 2007, p. 1. The trade-off, however, is that shutting down websites can lead to loss of valuable intelligence or evidence.

68. Andrew Garfield, "The U.S. Counter-propaganda Failure in Iraq," *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2007, www.meforum.org/article/1753.

69. Bernd Debusmann, "U.S. Foes Ramp Up Media Campaign in 'War of Ideas'," *Reuters*, October 27, 2006.

70. Chris Zambelis, "Iraqi Insurgent Media Campaign Targets American Audiences," *Terrorism Monitor*, Jamestown Foundation, 2007.

71. Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers," *International Herald Tribune*, October 14, 2007, relates the story of a young jihadi enthusiast who, born in Saudi Arabia but raised in the United States, became determined to "speak the truth," and created a blog that "serves as a kind of Western relay station for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups."

72. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, PCC, *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, Washington, DC, May 31, 2007.

73. *National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, 3. For an assessment, see GAO Report 07-904 - *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*, July 2007, www.gao.gov/highlights/d07904high.pdf, which recommended:

(1) the Secretary of State formally adopt a research-focused, 'campaign-style' approach to thematic communications; (2) State, BBG, DOD, and OSC systematically assess user needs and satisfaction; (3) the Secretary of State, in conjunction with other members of the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, establish protocols for sharing audience research information as well as create a research staff forum and clearinghouse of U.S. Government-sponsored research; and, (4) the Secretary of Defense ensure that planned steps to improve the coordination of media monitoring activities are implemented. Agencies agreed with these recommendations.

74. Waller, *Fighting the War of Ideas*, p. 145.

75. Task Force on Strategic Communication, Report of the Defense Science Board, January 2008, pp. xv-xvi. This structure would include the following elements: a deputy national security advisor and assistant to the President for strategic communication, a deputies committee, and a strategic communication policy committee.

76. Elizabeth A. Stanley, *International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy*, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2007, shows the danger of this, albeit from the standpoint of nuclear policy; her study underscores the importance of context; the war of ideas must be seen in light of other U.S. policies.

77. Curtis, "America's Image," p. 4.

78. "Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries," Washington, DC: The Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 24, 2007, p. 55: "Majorities in 15 of 16 Muslim publics surveyed say that suicide bombings can be rarely or never justified." The Muslim publics surveyed were Turkey, Egypt, Jordan,

Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. These results reflect a general decline in support for suicide bombing and violent methods since 2002; notably, that is not the case among Palestinians for whom support for suicide bombing remains widespread. This suggests that support for suicide bombing might depend upon the situation and the target. While support for suicide bombing is declining overall, "solid majorities" in each Muslim public polled say they are increasingly worried that the United States could become a military threat to their countries. Steven Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on U.S. Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al-Qaeda," *worldpublicopinion.org*, April 24, 2007.

79. Lieutenant Colonel Tony Pfaff, *Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008; "Iraq: Reflections on the Surge and the Way Forward," Press Event, Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, January 8, 2008, www.heritage.org/press/events/ev010808a.cfm.

80. Yair Minzili, "The Jordanian Regime Fights the War of Ideas," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 5, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, May 23, 2007.

81. Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2005, pp. 7-8. These attacks killed about 1,500 and wounded about 4,000 people, not including the many victims of operations in Iraq. One-third of all attacks involved non-Western targets, but the bulk of the victims overall were Muslims.

82. Jeffrey Imm, "Al-Qaeda's Gadahn: A Transcript by Laura Mansfield of Al-Qaeda's Adam Gadahn, January 6, 2008," counterterrorismblog.org.

In light of the unmistakable defeat of America's crusades in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the crushing blows being taken by its allies, proxies, and puppets around the world. And as America's senior officials shuttle back and forth from one crusader disaster zone to another in a desperate attempt to salvage what remains of America's

prestige. And after Bush brought together his loyal puppets in Annapolis to agree on the Judaization of Palestine, we felt it necessary to address the American people and explain to them some of the facts about these critical and fast moving events; events decisive to the history of America of the World. The first question Americans might ask is 'has America really been defeated?' The answer is: 'Yes. And on all fronts'.

See also Michael Scheuer, "Al-Qaeda Urges Iraq's Insurgents to Consolidate Victory over America," *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 4, No. 38, November 20, 2007; and "Al-Qaeda at Year's End 2007: What Do the Facts Say?" *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 4, No. 42, December 19, 2007.

83. S. R. Corman, A. Trethewey, and B. Goodall, "A 21st-Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity," Report No. 0701, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, April 2007; and S. R. Corman and K. J. Dooley, "Strategic Communication on a Rugged Landscape: Principles for Finding the Right Message," Report No. 0801, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, January 7, 2008.

84. Compare Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, February 13, 2006; Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, September 5, 2003; and Joint Publication 3-13.4, *Military Deception*, July 13, 2006.

85. The key elements of the HTS are (1) the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) which are positioned forward with brigade and regimental combat teams, (2) the Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) which is located at division headquarters, and, (3) the Reach-back Research Center (RCC) which is based at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Together, they help commanders incorporate "human terrain"—an understanding of local human dynamics—into the military decisionmaking process.

86. The HTTs purportedly assisted brigades:

in reducing their kinetic operations, in developing more effective courses of action, improving situational awareness, consequence management, support for host nation, intelligence collection and analysis, humanitarian assistance efforts, village assessments, information operations, and in decreasing enemy attacks and ordinary crime in their areas of operations.

Colonel Arthur V. Jewett, Director, Human Terrain System Assessment Team, "Human Terrain Team Preliminary Assessment: Executive Summary," July-August 2007, p. 2.